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Abstract
This paper investigates how switching costs affect product compatibility and
market dynamics in network industries. A reduction in the switching cost makes
the firms’ products more attractive relative to the outside good, which dimin-
ishes the market expansion benefit of making products compatible. As a result,
the larger firm is more likely to veto compatibility in order to maintain its
installed base advantage over its rival. Therefore, public policies that reduce
switching costs in network industries can change the market outcome from com-
patible products to incompatible products. In the former, price competition is
mild and the market is often fragmented, whereas in the latter, there is fierce
price competition when firms are of comparable size and in the long run the
market is likely dominated by one firm.
JEL: L11, L13
Keywords: product compatibility, switching costs, network industries, mar-
ket dynamics
1 Introduction
Switching cost is an important feature of network industries: consumers can switch between
networks but it is costly for them to do so (in terms of money and/or effort). Examples
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include PC operating systems, mobile networks, banking services, etc. In recent years, there
is a growing trend of regulations that aim at reducing switching costs in network industries
in order to increase competition. For instance, during the past few years, mobile number
portability (MNP) was implemented in more than forty countries, which reduces mobile
phone users’ switching costs by enabling them to retain their phone numbers when chang-
ing from one network to another. In the EU retail banking and payments systems markets,
the European Competition Authorities Financial Services Subgroup recommends the im-
plementation of switching facilities (objective and up-to-date comparison sites, switching
services, etc.) and account number portability to lower switching costs (ECAFSS (2006)).
While there are many studies on the effects of switching costs on market concentration
and prices, little is known about how a change in switching costs affects firms’ product
compatibility choices (shared free in-net calling, shared ATM networks, etc.) Since product
compatibility has significant impact on competition, consumer welfare, and total surplus,
research on this aspect is much needed and will generate rich policy implications. This
paper aims at filling this gap.
In this paper, I build an oligopolistic model of firms’ compatibility choices and price
competition, which incorporates both network effects and switching costs. Firms dynami-
cally optimize. They first choose product compatibility and then prices. A Markov perfect
equilibrium is numerically solved for, and I investigate how switching costs affect product
compatibility and market dynamics in such industries.
When the network effect is strong and the switching cost is modest, firms do not make
their products compatible. There is fierce price competition when firms are of comparable
size and in the long run the market is likely dominated by one firm (Tipping equilibrium).
In contrast, when the switching cost is strong, firms often make their products compatible.
Price competition is mild and the market is often fragmented (Compatibility equilibrium).
Public policies that reduce switching costs in network industries can change the market out-
come from Compatibility equilibrium to Tipping equilibrium, which significantly increases
market concentration and eliminates compatibility between firms’ products. Thus in order
to make sound decisions, regulators need to carefully predict and evaluate the evolution of
the market outcome that would result from the proposed policy change.
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Related Literature. There are a number of papers that investigate whether compati-
bility will emerge in a standard two-stage model: in the first stage, firms make compatibility
decisions, and then given such decisions, they engage in price or quantity competition. Ex-
amples include Katz and Shapiro (1986), Economides and Flyer (1997), Cremer, Rey, and
Tirole (2000), Malueg and Schwartz (2006), and Tran (2006). Also see the review of Farrell
and Klemperer (2007).
To go beyond the initial emergence of compatibility and understand whether compat-
ibility will be maintained as the industry evolves over time, we need to investigate the
long-run industry dynamics. Studies that explore the long-run market structure in net-
work industries include Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006), Llobet and Manove (2006), Driskill
(2007), Markovich (2008), and Cabral (2009), among others. Nonetheless, these studies do
not allow firms the option to make their product compatible, and hence cannot address the
issue of whether compatibility can be maintained in the long run. An exception is Chen,
Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009), which endogenizes product compatibility in a dynamic
stochastic setting. The paper, however, abstracts from consumer switching costs. In fact,
previous dynamic models of network industries generally assume that in each period, the
consumers who make buying decisions do not face any switching costs (examples include
Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Cabral (2009), and Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009),
etc.). In reality, some consumers in the marketplace are loyal to certain products and face
switching costs. A consumer’s loyalty can arise from prior use of the product (now her
product dies and she returns to the market) or from her relationship with current users (if
a consumer’s relatives, friends, or colleagues are users of a product, then she may become
familiar with and hence loyal to this product even if she has never purchased from this
market before). See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a review of the many papers that
investigate switching costs. Those papers are not in the context of network industries and
do not study firms’ long-run compatibility choices. Given the consumer loyalty and switch-
ing costs that exist in real-world network industries, it will be interesting to explore how
the analysis of firms’ compatibility decisions and industry dynamics is changed when we
incorporate switching costs into the model.
The next section describes the model. Section 3 presents the different types of equilibria
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that emerge in this model. Section 4 shows how the market outcome, especially market
concentration and compatibility of products, depends on the combination of the network
effect and the switching cost. Section 5 considers a counterfactual in which a reduction in
the switching cost changes the outcome from compatible products and a fragmented market
to incompatible products and market dominance. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes a dynamic oligopoly model of network industries in which firms have
the option to make their products compatible and consumers face switching costs. The
model builds on Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009) and adds switching costs.
2.1 State Space and Firm Decisions
The model is cast in discrete time with an infinite horizon. N ≥ 2 firms sell to a sequence of
buyers with unit demands. Each firm sells a single product and sets price. Firms’ products
are referred to as the inside goods, and are durable subject to stochastic death. There is also
an outside good (“no purchase”), indexed 0. At the beginning of a period, a firm is endowed
with an installed base which represents users of its product. bi ∈ {0, 1, ...,M} denotes
the installed base of firm i where M is the bound on the sum of the firms’ installed bases.
b0 =M−b1− ...−bN is the outside good’s “installed base”, though it does not offer network
benefits. The industry state is b = (b1, ..., bN ), with state space Ω = {(b1, ..., bN)|0 ≤ bi ≤M,
i = 1, ..., N ; b1 + ...+ bN ≤M}.
Given (b1, . . . , bN) , firms engage in a two-stage game, choosing compatibility in the first
stage and prices in the second stage. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to
“propose compatibility” with each of the other firms. Let dij ∈ {0, 1} be the compatibility
choice of firm i with respect to firm j, where dij = 1 means “propose compatibility.”
Products of firms i and j are “compatible” if and only if dij · dji = 1. After compatibilities
are determined, firms simultaneously choose prices in the second stage.
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2.2 Demand
Demand in each period comes from a random consumer who chooses one among the N +1
goods. r ∈ {0, 1, ...,N} denotes the good that has her loyalty. A consumer may be loyal to
a firm’s product because she previously used that product and now her product dies and
she returns to the market. A consumer may also be loyal to a firm’s product because of
her relationship with current users. For example, if a consumer is familiar with a particular
product because her relatives, friends, or colleagues are users of this product, then she may
be loyal to this product even if she has never purchased from this market before.
Assume r is distributed according to Pr(r = j|b) = bj/M, j = 0, 1, ..., N, so that a larger
installed base implies a larger expected demand from loyal consumers. The utility that a
consumer who is loyal to good r gets from buying good i is
vi + 1(i 6= 0)θg
⎛
⎝bi +
X
j 6=i
dijdjibj
⎞
⎠− pi − 1(r 6= 0, i 6= 0, i 6= r)k + i.
Here vi is the intrinsic product quality, which is fixed over time and is common across
firms: vi = v, i = 1, ...,N. Since the intrinsic quality parameters affect demand only through
the expression v − v0, without loss of generality I set v = 0, but consider different values
for v0.
bi +
P
j 6=i dijdjibj is the effective installed base of firm i given the set of compatible
products. The increasing function θg(.) captures network effects, where θ ≥ 0 is the para-
meter controlling the strength of network effect. There are no network effects associated
with the outside good. The results reported below are based on linear network effects, that
is, g(bi) = bi/M. I have also allowed g to be convex, concave, and S-shaped, and the main
results are robust.
pi denotes the price for good i. The price of the outside good, p0, is always zero.
The nonnegative constant k denotes switching cost, and is incurred if the consumer
switches from one inside good to another. A consumer who switches from the outside good
to an inside good incurs a start-up cost, which is normalized to 0. Increasing the start-up
cost above 0 has the effect of lowering the inside goods’ intrinsic quality relative to that of
the outside good.
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i is the consumer’s idiosyncratic preference shock. (0, 1, ..., N ) and r are unknown to
the firms when they set prices.
The consumer buys the good that offers the highest current utility. I am then assuming
that consumers make myopic decisions. Such a parsimonious specification of consumers’
decision-making allows rich modeling of firms’ prices and industry dynamics. Allowing
consumers to be forward-looking with rational expectations in the presence of both network
effects and switching costs is an important but challenging extension of the current work.
Assume i, i = 0, 1, ..., N is distributed type I extreme value, independent across prod-
ucts, consumers, and time. The probability that a consumer who is loyal to good r buys
good i is then
φri (b, d, p) ≡
exp
³
vi + 1(i 6= 0)θg
³
bi +
P
h 6=i dihdhibh
´
− pi − 1(r 6= 0, i 6= 0, i 6= r)k
´
PN
j=0 exp
³
vj + 1(j 6= 0)θg
³
bj +
P
h6=j djhdhjbh
´
− pj − 1(r 6= 0, j 6= 0, j 6= r)k
´ ,
(1)
where b is the vector of installed bases, d is the vector of compatibility choices, and p is the
vector of prices.
Note that in this model, switching costs are unchanged when firms make their product
compatible. Such a specification fits the examples mentioned in the Introduction, which are
implemented or being considered by regulators and which are the motivation of this paper.
For example, if two banks make their ATM networks compatible by allowing consumers
from each network to access ATMs in the other network for free, a consumer who switches
from one bank to the other still incurs the switching cost as she still needs to inform relevant
parties (direct deposits, automatic payments, one-click purchases, etc.) of her new account
number. Similarly, if two mobile service providers extend their free in-net calling to include
both networks, a consumer who switches from one network to the other still incurs the
switching cost as she still needs to inform her contacts of her new phone number.
There is another type of switching costs, which are eliminated when firms make their
products compatible. For example, if two producers of office applications software (spread-
sheets, charts, presentations, word processing documents, etc.) make their products com-
patible by adopting the same standard, a consumer who switches no longer needs to convert
her old files to a new format and hence the switching cost of file conversion is eliminated. I
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do not investigate such switching costs in this paper.
2.3 Transition Probabilities
In each period, each unit of a firm’s installed base independently depreciates with probability
δ ∈ [0, 1], for example due to product death. Thus the expected size of the depreciation to
a firm’s installed base is proportional to the size of its installed base. Let ∆(x|bi) denote
the probability that firm i’s installed base depreciates by x units. We have
∆(x|bi) =
µ
bi
x
¶
δx(1− δ)bi−x, x = 0, ..., bi,
since x is distributed binomial with parameters (bi, δ).
Let qi ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether or not firm i makes the sale. Firm i’s installed base
changes according to the transition function
Pr(b0i|bi, qi) = ∆(bi + qi − b0i|bi), b0i = qi, ..., bi + qi.
If the joint outcome of the sale and the depreciation results in an industry state outside of
the state space, the probability that would be assigned to that state is given to the nearest
state(s) on the boundary of the state space.
2.4 Bellman Equation and Strategies
The consumer’s idiosyncratic preference shocks and the good that has her loyalty are sto-
chastic and unknown to the firms when they set prices. Let Vi(b) denote the expected net
present value of future cash flows to firm i in state b before compatibility decisions are made,
and let Ui(b, d) denote the expected net present value of future cash flows to firm i in state
b after compatibility decisions are made and revealed to all firms. For the second-stage
game, we have1
Ui(b, d) = max
pi
Er
⎡
⎣φri(b, d, pi, p−i(b, d))pi + β
NX
j=0
φrj(b, d, pi, p−i(b, d))V ij(b)
⎤
⎦ , (2)
1Recall that firms’ products are durable (subject to stochastic death), and that demand in each period
comes from a random consumer.
7
where p−i(b, d) are the prices charged by firm i’s rivals in equilibrium (given the installed
bases and the compatibility choices), the (constant) marginal cost of production is normal-
ized to zero, β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor, and V ij(b) is the expected continuation value
to firm i given that firm j wins the current consumer:
V ij(b) =
X
b0
Pr(b0|b, qj = 1)V 0i (b0).
Differentiating the right-hand side of equation (2) with respect to pi and using the
properties of logit demand yields the first-order condition
Er
⎡
⎣−φri(1− φri)(pi + βV ii) + φri + βφri
X
j 6=i
φrjV ij
⎤
⎦ = 0. (3)
The pricing strategies p(b, d) are the solution to the system of first-order conditions.
Folding back to the first-stage game, we have
Vi(b) = max
di∈{0,1}N−1
Ui(b, di, d−i(b)), (4)
where di = (di1, . . . , dii−1, dii+1, . . . , diN) and d−i(b) are the compatibility choices of firm i’s
rivals in equilibrium (given the installed bases).
2.5 Equilibrium
I focus attention on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), where symmetry means
agents with identical states are required to behave identically. For example, if there are
two firms, then symmetry means firm 2’s price in state (b1, b2) = (bb,bbb) is identical to firm
1’s price in state (b1, b2) = (
bbb,bb), and similarly for the value function. I therefore define
p(b1, b2) ≡ p1(b1, b2) and V (b1, b2) ≡ V1(b1, b2), and note that p2(b1 = bb, b2 = bbb) = p(bbb,bb)
and V2(b1 = bb, b2 = bbb) = V (bbb,bb).
I restrict attention to pure strategies, which follows the majority of the literature on nu-
merically solving dynamic stochastic games (Pakes and McGuire (1994), Pakes and McGuire
(2001)). A symmetric MPE in pure strategies always exists (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010)), but as is true with many other dynamic models, there may exist multiple MPE. I
therefore take a widely used selection rule in the dynamic games literature by computing
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the limit of a finite-horizon game as the horizon grows to infinity (for details see Chen,
Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009)).
A second source of multiplicity of MPE comes from firms’ compatibility choices. Recall
that products are compatible between firms i and j if and only if both firms propose com-
patibility. Therefore, for any state there is always an equilibrium outcome in which firms’
products are incompatible. When it is also an equilibrium for products to be compatible,
I select that equilibrium because my interest is in exploring the implications of product
compatibility, and because the equilibrium with compatible products Pareto dominates the
one with incompatible products. Additionally, if a firm is indifferent about whether or not
to make its product compatible, I assume it proposes incompatibility.2 With the above
equilibrium selection rules in place, the iterative algorithm always converged and resulted
in a unique MPE.
2.6 Parameterization
The key parameters of the model are the strength of network effect θ, the switching cost k,
the rate of depreciation δ, and the quality of the outside good v0. I examine several values
for v0 between −∞ and 0 and set the baseline at −4, representing a case in which there
exists an outside good but it is inferior compared to the inside goods. The lower bound for
δ is zero and corresponds to the unrealistic case in which installed bases never depreciate.
On the other hand, if δ is sufficiently high then the industry never takes off. I consider
many values for δ between 0 and 0.15. I investigate the following values for the strength
of network effect and the switching cost: θ ∈ {0, 0.5, ..., 4} , and k ∈ {0, 0.5, ..., 3}. While I
extensively vary the key parameters, I hold the remaining parameters constant at N = 2,
M = 20, and β = 11.05 , which corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 5%.
While the model is not intended to fit any specific product, the own-price elasticities
for the parameterizations that I consider are reasonable compared with findings in several
empirical studies. As representative examples of the equilibria in the model, the own-price
elasticities for the parameterizations in Figures 1-3 range from −0.71 to −0.62. These num-
bers are in line with the own-price elasticities reported in Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000)
2Experimentation with the tie-breaking rule revealed that it does not make a difference for the results.
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(−0.54 for CD players, computed according to results reported in the paper), Clements and
Ohashi (2005) (ranging from −2.15 to −0.18 for video game consoles), and Dick (2008)
(ranging from −0.87 to −0.12 for banking services).3 Additionally, the aggregate market
shares of the inside goods for the parameterizations in Figures 1-3 range from 93.5% to
98.9%. These numbers are consistent with, for instance, the cellular mobile penetration
rates in OECD countries, which averaged at 96.1% in 2007 (OECD (2009)).
3 Types of Equilibria
In this model three types of equilibria emerge, Rising, Tipping, and Compatibility.
Rising Equilibrium. A Rising equilibrium (depicted in Figure 1) occurs when both
network effect and switching cost are weak. A firm’s price monotonically rises in its own
installed base and falls in its rival’s installed base (see Panel 1, which plots firm 1’s equilib-
rium price against the firms’ installed bases). Products are generally incompatible, except
possibly when the firms have identical installed bases (see Panel 2, which reports the com-
patibility region, that is, the states for which both firms prefer compatibility and thus
products are compatible.).
Panels 3 and 4 show the evolution of the industry structure over time. They plot the
15-period transient distribution of installed bases (which gives the frequency with which
the industry state takes a particular value after 15 periods, starting from state (0, 0) in
period 0) and the limiting distribution (which gives the frequency with which the state
takes a particular value as the number of periods approaches infinity), respectively. The
unimodal transient distribution and limiting distribution show that the market is generally
fragmented, as the industry spends most of the time in fairly symmetric states.
Panel 5 plots the probability that a firm makes a sale, and Panel 6 plots the resultant
forces, which report the expected movement of the state from one period to the next (for
visibility of the arrows, the lengths of all arrows are normalized to 1, therefore only the
direction, not the magnitude, of the expected movement is reported). The larger firm wins
3Some other studies, such as Dranove and Gandal (2003), Ohashi (2003), and Doganoglu and Grzybowski
(2007), find evidence of more elastic demand in several network industries.
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the consumer with a higher probability (Panel 5). However, the larger firm’s expected size
of depreciation is also larger. In a Rising equilibrium, the difference in expected depreciation
more than offsets the difference in expected sales, and as a result the difference in installed
bases shrinks in expectation (Panel 6).
Tipping Equilibrium. A Tipping equilibrium (depicted in Figure 2) occurs when the
network effect is strong and the switching cost is modest. There is a deep trench along and
around the diagonal of the price function (Panel 1), indicating intense price competition
when firms’ installed bases are of comparable size. Once a firm pulls ahead, the smaller firm
gives up the fight by raising its price, thereby propelling the larger firm into a dominant
position. Products are almost always incompatible (Panel 2).
The transient distribution (Panel 3) and the limiting distribution (Panel 4) are bimodal.
Over time, the industry moves towards asymmetric states, and the market tends to be
dominated by a single firm. The larger firm enjoys a significant advantage in expected sales
(Panel 5), which results from the smaller firm’s willingness to surrender (by charging high
prices), and gives rise to the forces that pull the industry away from the diagonal once an
asymmetry arises (Panel 6).
Compatibility Equilibrium. A Compatibility equilibrium (depicted in Figure 3) oc-
curs when the switching cost is strong. Products are compatible when firms have comparable
installed bases (Panel 2). In the compatibility region, prices are high, peaking at the point
where each firm has half of the consumers (Panel 1). Off of the peak, the smaller firm drops
its price in order to bring the industry back to the peak. In particular, around the border of
the compatibility region, the smaller firm lowers its price significantly, in an effort to keep
the industry in the compatibility region. Away from the peak, the larger firm also drops its
price, but that is a response to the smaller firm’s aggressive pricing rather than an effort to
achieve market dominance.
The switching cost segments the market into submarkets, with each submarket consisting
of consumers that are locked-in by a firm. Firms focus on charging high prices to “harvest”
their locked-in consumers, rather than fighting for market dominance. As a result, the
market tends to be fragmented, as shown by the unimodal transient distribution and limiting
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distribution in Panels 3 and 4.
The resultant forces (Panel 6) show global convergence towards the symmetric modal
state. Outside the compatibility region, the larger firm enjoys a larger expected sale, but
inside the compatibility region, the smaller firm has an advantage (Panel 5). Such an
advantage for the smaller firm results from its aggressive pricing away from the peak, aimed
at keeping the industry in the compatibility region.
4 Market Concentration and Compatibility
For the primary dynamic forces of the model to be at work, the relevant part of the para-
meter space is when the rate of depreciation δ is neither too low (so that there is customer
turnover) nor too high (otherwise the industry never takes off). In that part of the para-
meter space, the switching cost and its interaction with the network effect have significant
impact on market concentration and the firms’ compatibility choices.
Panel 1 in Figure 4 shows the expected long-run Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI;
based on installed bases and weighted by probabilities in the limiting distribution) for
different combinations of the network effect θ and the switching cost k. The higher is the
HHI, the more likely market dominance is to occur. When the network effect is low to
modest (θ ∈ [0, 2]), the HHI is low throughout, increasing slightly in the switching cost.
Examination of the policy function and the limiting distribution in this part of the parameter
space indicates that the equilibrium gradually morphs from a Rising equilibrium at low
switching cost to a Compatibility equilibrium at modest to high switching cost.
When the network effect is modest to high (θ ∈ [2.5, 4]), the HHI starts with a relatively
high level (above 0.6) at k = 0. As the switching cost increases, the HHI initially increases
but later drops significantly. When the switching cost is modest, the market is dominated
by a single firm (Tipping equilibrium), but when the switching cost is high, the market
becomes fragmented (Compatibility equilibrium).
Next, Panel 2 shows the long-run probability that products are compatible using the
limiting distribution. The panel shows that when the switching cost is low, the probability of
compatible products is small for weak network effect and essentially zero for strong network
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effect. However, in both cases, the probability of compatible products increases significantly
as the switching cost increases, indicating that the switching cost plays an important role
in determining firms’ compatibility choices.
5 Counterfactual: Reduction in Switching Cost
Here we study a counterfactual in which a public policy reduces the switching cost in a
network industry. Examples of such policies include phone number portability in the mobile
phone industry, account number portability in the banking industry, etc. In particular,
we are interested in how product compatibility (shared free in-net calling, shared ATM
networks, etc.) and market dynamics are affected by such a policy change.
Consider the Compatibility equilibrium depicted in Figure 3, with (θ, k) = (3, 2.5). In
this market, both the network effect and the switching cost are high, and the industry
is characterized by relatively symmetric firms and a substantial probability of compatible
products.
Now suppose the regulator implements a policy that reduces the switching cost k from 2.5
to 0.5, so that we reach the parameterization in the Tipping equilibrium depicted in Figure
2. Assume that the policy change is unanticipated (so that firms do not alter their behavior
beforehand) and that the reduction in the switching cost is permanent. Figure 5 shows the
evolution of the market following such a change. From top to bottom, the four panels plot
the time paths of the firms’ installed bases, probability of compatible products, prices, and
probabilities of sale, respectively, from period 0 to period 50. In period 0, k is 2.5 and we
assume the industry is in the expected long-run state (given by the limiting distribution) in
the Compatibility equilibrium. In period 1 k is permanently reduced to 0.5, and the industry
gradually evolves towards the expected long-run state under the new parameterization. The
solid lines show the expectations (based on the transient distributions) of the variables for
the larger firm, and the dashed lines show those for the smaller firm.
Panel 1 indicates that before the reduction in k, the two firms’ expected installed bases
are similar in size, 9.5 for the larger firm and 6.3 for the smaller firm. When k is reduced to
0.5, the difference between the installed bases gradually widens, reaching 8.3 in the long run
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(12.2 for the larger firm and 3.9 for the smaller firm). This panel shows that following the
reduction in k, market fragmentation in the Compatibility equilibrium morphs into market
dominance in the Tipping equilibrium.
Panel 2 shows that in period 0, the two firms’ products are compatible with probability
0.55, but the probability drops to 0 following the reduction in k and stays at 0. Examination
of the firms’ payoffs associated with compatible products and incompatible products shows
that it is the larger firm who vetoes compatibility. Making products compatible expands
the market for the firms by making their products more attractive relative to the outside
good (the market expansion effect), and eliminates the larger firm’s installed base advantage
over its rival (the business gift effect). While both effects are helpful for the smaller firm,
they affect the larger firm in opposite directions: the market expansion effect helps the
larger firm whereas the business gift effect hurts the larger firm. See Chen, Doraszelski, and
Harrington (2009) for a discussion of these two effects. In the current model, a reduction
in the switching cost makes the firms’ products more attractive and reduces the relevance
of the outside good. Consequently, the market expansion benefit is diminished, making the
larger firm more likely to veto compatibility. In fact, when k is reduced to 0.5, the market
outcome changes to a Tipping equilibrium, in which the probability of compatibility is 0.
Panel 3 shows the changes in the firms’ prices following the reduction in k. In period
0, the larger firm’s price is 3.0 and the smaller firm’s price is 2.0. In period 1, these prices
drop significantly to 0.1 and 0.6, respectively. Note that in its drive to achieve market
dominance, the larger firm drops its price much more aggressively than the smaller firm.
In fact, starting from period 1, the larger firm consistently charges a lower price than the
smaller firm until period 14, by which time the installed base differential has reached 6.5
and the larger firm’s dominant position is all but secured.
Panel 4 shows the evolution of the probabilities of sale by the two firms. In period 0,
the two firms have nearly identical probabilities of sale: 0.47 for the larger firm and 0.50 for
the smaller firm. Once k is reduced to 0.5 and the larger firm starts pricing aggressively,
its probability of sale is much larger than its rival’s. From period 1 to period 50, the
larger firm’s probability of sale increases slightly from 0.72 to 0.74, while the smaller firm’s
probability decreases slightly from 0.28 to 0.24. This large difference between the two firms’
14
probabilities of sale is the force that allows the larger firm to achieve and maintain market
dominance.
Together, the four panels in Figure 5 illustrate the substantial changes in the market
outcome when the switching cost is reduced. In particular, it shows that market concen-
tration can significantly increase and compatibility between firms’ products can disappear
following such a policy change. Thus in order to make sound decisions, regulators need to
carefully predict and evaluate the evolution of the market outcome that would result from
the proposed policy change.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate how switching costs affect product compatibility and market dy-
namics in network industries. A reduction in the switching cost makes the firms’ products
more attractive relative to the outside good, which diminishes the market expansion benefit
of making products compatible. As a result, the larger firm is more likely to veto com-
patibility in order to maintain its installed base advantage over its rival. Therefore, public
policies that reduce switching costs in network industries can change the market outcome
from compatible products to incompatible products. In the former, price competition is
mild and the market is often fragmented, whereas in the latter, there is fierce price compe-
tition when firms are of comparable size and in the long run the market is likely dominated
by one firm. Thus, when deciding whether to implement a public policy that reduces the
switching cost, the regulator needs to carefully predict and evaluate the evolution of the
market outcome, including market concentration and compatibility of products, that would
result from the proposed policy change.
In ongoing work, I am also analyzing various policies regarding compatibility, such as
mandatory compatibility (e.g. government-imposed standardization), endogenous compat-
ibility (laissez-faire), and no compatibility. How do these policies perform for a market
with network effects and switching costs? From a welfare perspective, how do consumers
and firms rank such policies, and how do their rankings change as switching costs are var-
ied? A good understanding of these issues will allow regulators to make informed decisions
15
regarding product compatibility and switching costs in network industries.
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Figure 1. Rising equilibrium: v0 = −4, δ = 0.06, θ = 1.5, k = 0.5
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Figure 2. Tipping equilibrium: v0 = −4, δ = 0.06, θ = 3, k = 0.5
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Figure 3. Compatibility equilibrium: v0 = −4, δ = 0.06, θ = 3, k = 2.5
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Figure 4. Expected long-run HHI and compatibility
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
5
10
15
20
t
bL
,b
S
(1) Installed base
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
1
2
3
t
p
L
,p
S
(3) Price
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
d
L
d
S
(2) Probability of compatibility
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
φ
L
,φ
S
(4) Probability of sale
Figure 5. Time paths following a reduction in the switching cost.
v0 = −4, δ = 0.06, θ = 3, k is reduced from 2.5 in period 0 to 0.5 in all subsequent periods.
Solid line: the larger firm. Dashed line: the smaller firm.
